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Industrial Policy in Britain since 1970: 
Changing Values, Assumptions and  
Mechanisms  
Abstract: This article examines the change in the fundamental assumptions 
underpinning industrial policy from the mid-1970s in Britain. It necessarily 
contrasts the broadly supply-side concerns of industrial policy from the mid-
1970s with the more demand-side concerns of the earlier ‘Golden Age’ period 
from 1945. Where in the earlier period the emphasis in industrial policy was on 
capital investment and the role of government in compensating for perceived 
market inefficiency, from the late 1970s this emphasis shifted to the need to 
improve the flexibility and quality of supply-side factors allied to a more opti-
mistic view of the ability of the market to secure efficient outcomes.   
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1  Introduction 
Comparing postwar industrial policy and industrial structure in Britain before 
and after 1970 throws up some sharp contrasts and some abiding continuities. 
The main continuity is a concern with productivity, and especially so in manu-
facturing industry. The main contrast is that of unemployment. Between 1951 
and 1975 the level of unemployment was never higher than one million people; 
from 1976 it was never (ever) to fall below one million. The male unemployment 
rate of around 17 percent in 1985 compared unfavourably with that of around 
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Martin Chick (Prof.), School of History, Classics and Archaeology, William Robertson Wing, Old 
Medical School, 4 Teviot Place, Edinburgh, Scotland, EH8 9AG, E-mail: Martin.Chick@ed.ac.uk 
36   |   Martin Chick  
two percent in the 1950s.1 With the passage of time the thirty years of postwar 
growth, called Les Trente Glorieuses in France and, covering a slightly shorter 
period (1945-1973), the Golden Age in the UK, increasingly appear unusual. In 
1857-1913 average unemployment in the UK was 4.4 percent of the civilian work-
ing population and 10.6 percent in 1920-1938. The 1.9 percent of 1951-1973 in-
creasingly looks odd.2 Yet, for many in the 1950s and 1960s Britain, low unem-
ployment, low inflation and steady, if unspectacular, growth became the 
expected norm. 
During the Golden Age, industrial policy concentrated on improving 
productivity, on encouraging mergers in pursuit of economies of scale and on 
prioritising manufacturing industry as an important source of technological and 
productivity advance. Encouraging industrial investment was an important 
feature of industrial policy and government was seen as having a role to play in 
reducing uncertainty, raising expectations and thereby inducing higher level of 
investment from the private sector. The ability of market mechanisms alone to 
restructure industries in which vested interests and restrictive practices oper-
ated was viewed with scepticism and Labour government advisors such as the 
Hungarian economists Nicholas Kaldor and Thomas Balogh were to the fore in 
urging the use of government intervention to hasten industrial restructuring 
and modernisation at a speed faster than that likely to be achieved by the mar-
ket. In part, it was recognised that restructuring could be achieved by exposing 
the UK economy to greater international competition, but only at a cost of con-
siderable unemployment. For this reason both Kaldor and Balogh were fearful 
of what might happen were the UK to join the Common Market, as it eventually 
did in 1973. In part the rise in unemployment which occurred from the mid-
1970s, and the rapid contraction of employment in manufacturing industry, 
were caused by membership of the Common Market. The postwar protection 
offered by limited currency convertibility until the start of 1959 and the strong 
international growth and consumer demand of the 1960s were replaced from 
1973 by increasing competition from Common Market competitors and oil price 
hikes in 1973-4 and 1979-81. 
As economic conditions changed, so too did the aims and instruments of 
policy. Whatever one thinks about how ‘Keynesian’ any Golden Age might have 
been, there was a significant shift in the role envisaged for the government in 
|| 
1–R. Layard/S. Nickell, Unemployment in Britain, in: C. Bean/R. Layard/S. Nickell (Eds.), The 
Rise in Unemployment, Oxford 1986, pp. 121-169, here p. 121 (the figures are for male unem-
ployment because there is no consistent series for women). 
2–R. Matthews/C. Feinstein/J. Odling-Smee, British Economic Growth 1856-1973, Oxford 1982,  
p. 81, Table 3.18. 
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industrial policy. A shift from demand-led to supply-side policies did occur, 
however vague and general such a characterisation might be considered to be. 
Public expenditure did not fall, but it became more concerned with making 
transfer payments to the unemployed than with maintaining public pro-
grammes of fixed capital investment. Nationalisation gave way to privatisation, 
not only of industries but also of council houses. Views of the efficiency of mar-
kets changed, with a more optimistic view being taken of their ability to effect 
the necessary industrial restructuring and to promote productivity. The empha-
sis in industrial policy shifted from the exogenous to the endogenous with the 
role of the state being seen as providing the conditions for growth rather than 
owning or attempting to restructure important sections of the economy. In this 
paper, the aims, assumptions and mechanisms of industrial policy will be ex-
amined, beginning with an analysis of the changes in the rate and incidence of 
unemployment. It will then move on to consider the changed role envisaged for 
the market both in reducing unemployment and in restructuring the economy. 
2  Deindustrialisation 
The size of the British workforce increased throughout the 1970s and in 1994 
was over 2.8 million higher than it had been in 1971. Over the 1971-1994 period 
the number in employment rose by almost one million. However, what was 
most striking was the rise in the number of unemployed people, and especially 
the surges in unemployment in 1975-1977 and the almost doubling of unem-
ployment from 1.6 million in 1980 to 3.1 million in 1983. Over the ten years from 
1976 to 1986 unemployment climbed from 1.3 million to almost 3.3 million. Un-
employment continued to persist at a much higher level than in the Golden Age, 
almost touching three million again in 1993. By the mid-1970s, unemployment 
and the nature of ‘deindustrialisation’ primarily in manufacturing were lively 
topics of debate.3 
By the early 1980s, the discussion of deindustrialisation had even intensi-
fied as manufacturing unemployment rose further.4 Especially vulnerable were 
manufacturing export industries, notably metal manufacture (dominated by 
|| 
3–A. Singh, UK Industry and the World Economy: A Case of Deindustrialisation?, in: Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics 1, 1977, pp. 113-136. 
4–R. Matthews/J. Sargent, Introduction, in: Idem (Eds.), Contemporary Problems of Economic 
Policy, London 1983, p. 1; F. Blackaby, Deindustrialisation, London 1979; R. Rowthorn/J. Wells, 
De-Industrialisation and Foreign Trade, Cambridge 1987. 
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iron and steel) and vehicles. In some cases the increase in unemployment was 
very striking. While total unemployment increased by just over 70 percent be-
tween 1980 and 1981, and by 89 percent in all manufacturing industries, the 
jumps in metal manufacture (104 percent) and metal goods (121 percent), me-
chanical engineering (115 percent), and vehicles (160 percent) were eye-catch-
ing. As manufacturers of internationally traded goods, these industries were 
subject to competition in their export and domestic markets. Not only did the 
two oil price hikes of 1973/4 and 1979/80 raise their energy costs while reducing 
aggregate demand as oil revenues were saved, but the UK’s accession to the EEC 
on 1st January 1973 also intensified competition. So too did the appreciation of 
the exchange rate, moving from $1.80 in 1976 to $2.32 in 1980.5 Such shocks 
were considerable for an economy which even in 1970 was exporting more to 
‘British countries’ than to the EEC.6 
Increasing competition in traded goods exposed industries with compara-
tively lower productivity. UK manufacturing industries like motor vehicles and 
iron and steel production which employed large workforces in a production 
process in which economies of scale arising from the use of capital investment 
were important proved vulnerable. The attainment of just such economies of 
scale and the modernisation of manufacturing industry had been major con-
cerns of the industrial policy of the Labour governments from 1964 to 1970. This 
was the most intense period of central technocratic industrial policy but 
throughout the Golden Age, priority in industrial policy was given to manufac-
turing, this in part reflecting the primacy accorded to fixed capital investment 
as a factor of production. This was encouraged by the work of Edward Denison 
and Robert Solow and the development of a growth accounting approach to 
evaluating the sources of economic growth. Commonly in growth accounting, 
among the sources of growth for different economies, the role of capital quality 
was broadly similar. This reflected the process of technological transfer between 
economies. Of greater value in accounting for differences in growth rates were 
the impact of capital quantity and the residual measure of Total Factor Produc-
tivity (TFP). Such measures often confirmed the paradoxical dilemma of British 
economic growth. That, when in the Golden Age growth was at its highest rate 
in British economic history, so too was it relatively slower compared with faster 
|| 
5–S. Broadberry, The Performance of Manufacturing, in: R. Floud/P. Johnson (Eds.), The Cam-
bridge Economic History of Modern Britain, vol. 3, New York 2004, pp. 57-83, here p. 65; Central 
Statistical Office, Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1996, London 1995, p. 223, Table 5.1. 
6–S. Broadberry, The Productivity Race: British Manufacturing in International Perspective 
1850-1990, Cambridge 1997, p. 95. ‘British countries’ includes the Irish Free State/Republic and 
the Republic of South Africa, as well as the Commmonwealth. 
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growing economies such as France, West Germany and Japan. In the period 
1951-73 when complaints of internationally comparative low growth were made, 
the output growth of 4.4 percent p.a., labour productivity growth of 4.3 percent 
p.a. and TFP growth of 2.9 percent were all higher than in the 1924-37 period 
when output grew at 3.2 percent, labour productivity at 1.8 percent and TFP at 
1.9 percent.7 Conversely, when UK growth rates slowed, they rose relative to her 
international competitors. 
3  Microeconomics, Inflation and the Labour Market 
From 1975, industrial policy shifted away from a demand-side concern with 
economies of scale and modernisation, to a supply-side concern with promoting 
flexible, higher-quality conditions for growth. The previous interest in physical 
capital gave way to a greater interest in the development of human capital as 
part of a wider move from exogenous to endogenous growth theory.8 Exogenous 
growth theory was rooted in assumptions of continual technological progress,9 
while endogenous growth theory which became popular in the 1980s argued 
that growth arose from decisions and interactions within the entire economic 
system. From the mid-1970s these changes were accompanied by the displace-
ment of low unemployment by low inflation as the principal objective of macro-
economic policy, in the labour market by increased female participation and in 
industrial relations by a greater willingness to use the law in constraining the 
activities of trade unions. By 2000 the industrial structure and the composition 
of the workforce looked very different from that of 1951. In that process of 
change, fundamental assumptions concerning the role of markets and govern-
ments had also been challenged and reassessed. The replacement of low unem-
ployment by low inflation as the principal objective of government economic 
policy is usually formally dated to Prime Minister James Callaghan’s speech to 
the Labour Party Conference in Blackpool in 1976. Declaring that the govern-
ment rejected “unemployment as an economic instrument”, Callaghan none-
theless claimed that: 
|| 
7–Broadberry, Performance of Manufacturing, p. 59. 
8–Broadberry, Productivity Race, p. 72; P. Romer, The Origins of Endogenous Growth, in: The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 8, 1994, pp. 3-22; J. Caballe/M. Santos, On Endogenous 
Growth with Physical and Human Capital, in: The Journal of Political Economy 101, 1993,  
pp. 1042-1067. 
9–P. Aghion/P. Howitt, Endogenous Growth Theory, Cambridge Mass. 1998. 
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“we used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession, and increase em-
ployment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour 
that that option no longer exists, and that in so far as it ever did exist, it only worked on 
each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, fol-
lowed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step. Higher inflation followed by 
higher unemployment. We have just escaped from the highest rate of inflation this coun-
try has known; we have not yet escaped from the consequences: high unemployment. 
This is the history of the last 20 years”.10 
Callaghan’s statement is interesting as a conflation of a series of prevailing 
economic theories concerning the relationship between unemployment and 
inflation; it is not that far from Milton Friedman’s view that “what recent British 
governments have tried to do is to keep unemployment below the natural rate, 
and to do so they have had to accelerate inflation”.11 The prevailing view for 
policy purposes had been that of Alban W. Phillips, he of the eponymous curve, 
and the Phillips Curve was subsequently supported by work from Richard 
Lipsey, both based at the London School of Economics. In his article in the 
journal Economica in 1957 Phillips noted that for the peacetime years 1861-1956 
in the UK, the rate at which the nominal wage level changed was a decreasing 
function of the rate of unemployment. A rate of unemployment of 2-3 percent 
seemed to hold the rate of inflation at 2-3 percent; an unemployment rate of 6-8 
percent seemed to take inflation to zero. The Phillips Curve was criticised by 
some economists but so long as Golden Age conditions persisted government 
was thought to use it as one means of guiding the economy. 
Once stagflation appeared, then it became difficult to maintain unthinking 
adherence to the Phillips Curve and the criticisms began to be listened to. These 
came from different sources but proved complementary. In part, the critics 
placed greater emphasis on the microeconomic underpinnings of macroeco-
nomic policy. Some like Edmund Phelps at Columbia University, as in his edited 
book Microeconomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, empha-
sised the intertemporal aspect of wage negotiations and the accelerationist 
implications of trying to hold unemployment down below its equilibrium level.12 
|| 
10–James Callaghan’s presentation of the report of the Parliamentary Labour Party to the 
Labour Party Conference in Blackpool in 1976, http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-
archive.htm?speech=174, 20.07.2016. 
11–M. Friedman, Price Theory, Chicago 1976, p. 227; Idem, Unemployment versus Inflation: An 
Evaluation of the Phillips Curve (Occasional Paper 44, Institut for Economic Affairs, London 1975). 
12–E. Phelps, Money Wage Dynamics and Labour Market Equilibrium, in: Idem (Ed.), Microe-
conomic Foundations of Employment and Inflation Theory, New York 1970, pp. 124-166, here  
p. 127; Idem, Phillips Curves, Expectations of Inflation and Optimal Unemployment Over Time, 
in: Economica 34, 1967, pp. 254-281. 
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There was also a move towards applying rational expectations, as originally 
developed by John Muth in 1961, with developments around a very micro model 
by Robert E. Lucas and in an intertemporal one by Thomas J. Sargent.13 The 
criticism was that governments which sought to trade off price stability against 
reduced unemployment ultimately encouraged expectations of regularly in-
creasing wages. Such thinking meshed with Milton Friedman’s idea of there 
being a Natural Rate of Unemployment (NRU) which itself referred back to Ir-
ving Fisher’s 1926 article, ‘A statistical relation between unemployment and 
price changes’.14 The NRU was that rate of employment which was consistent 
with the existing real conditions in the labour market. Friedman was particu-
larly critical of Phillips’s presentation of the demand and supply of labour as 
being functions of nominal wages, instead of real wages. Friedman saw the rate 
of wage change as being a function of the unemployment rate plus the expected 
rate of price inflation, the implicit rationale being that the amount of labour 
supplied was an increasing function of the expected real value of the nominal 
wage. The idea that a steady state of unemployment existed within a dynamic 
general equilibrium system had existed for some time, but it was Friedman who 
coined the term ‘natural rate’. He likened this to Knut Wicksell’s natural rate of 
interest, in that both sought to distinguish between the real and monetary forc-
es. In this sense, the natural rate as developed by Friedman and Phelps did not 
correspond to any particular rate of inflation because there could be no long-
run trade-off between inflation and unemployment; there was no long-run 
money illusion and the long-run Phillips curve was vertical.  
A potential danger of the NRU approach was that it would be seen by politi-
cians as absolving them from political responsibility for what was happening to 
unemployment,15 that the Natural Rate Hypothesis would convince policy-mak-
ers that the rate of unemployment was in the long run, independent of the de-
mand-side policies of the government. In the short-run, downturns might be 
interpreted as cyclical movements around and below the natural rate, but the 
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13–J. Muth, Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, in: Econometrica 29, 
1961, pp. 315-335; T. Sargent, Rational Expectations, the Real Rate of Interest and the ‘Natural’ 
Rate of Unemployment, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1973, pp. 429-472; R. Lucas, 
Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, in: Journal of Economic Theory 4, 1972, pp. 103-124; 
Idem, Some International Evidence on Output-Inflation Tradeoffs, in: American Economic 
Review 63, 1973, pp. 326-34. 
14–M. Friedman, The Role of Monetary Policy, in: American Economic Review 58, 1968, pp. 1-17. 
15–F. Hahn, Theoretical Reflections on the ‘Natural Rate of Unemployment’, in: R. Cross (Ed.), 
The Natural Rate of Unemployment: Reflections on 25 Years of the Hypothesis, Cambridge 
1995, p. 44. 
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critical issue here was the extent to which short-term cyclical unemployment 
turned in time into long-term structural unemployment. In this respect, follow-
ing the fall in public sector capital formation since 1976, the appreciation of the 
exchange rate and the sharp increase in unemployment since 1975, the Con-
servatives’ 1980 Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) was highly conten-
tious. In seeking to create a creditable economic strategy so as to manage infla-
tionary expectations downwards, it also adopted a pro-cyclical policy during a 
slump. The extent to which stocks nosedived in 1980, 1981 and 1982 was strik-
ing. As the economist John Hicks noted, this run down of stocks may in turn 
have reduced the scope for relying on the multiplier to increase economic activ-
ity (see table 1). The concern was with the extent to which a pro-cyclical policy 
increased cyclical unemployment which mutated in time into structural unem-
ployment. In the 1980s economies with larger decreases in inflation and longer 
disinflationary periods experienced larger increases in their natural rates of 
unemployment.16 
What became of increasing concern in the 1980s was not simply the level of 
unemployment but its persistence even as inflation fell. That the level of unem-
ployment settled at three million as the rate of inflation slowed suggested that 
an effect of any cyclical unemployment had in fact been to add to structural 
unemployment. Labour which had remained in unemployment had atrophied. 
Although by the 1980s, marginal tax rates had fallen, union powers had been 
curtailed, and the benefit wage replacement ratio had been reduced, still the 
NRU was higher than it had been in the inflationary 1970s. In the comparatively 
low inflation in Britain of the 1950s and 1960s, there were roughly twice as 
many vacancies as unemployed; in the 1980s boom, there were twice as many 
unemployed as vacancies.17 Some of the grander claims made by Milton Fried-
man in his 1976 Nobel Lecture that it was only by reducing the rate of inflation 
that unemployment would be lowered in the long-run begged questions as to 
the length of the long-run and raised questions as to whether the rate of unem-
ployment, if related on the way down to inflation, was now less natural than it 
|| 
16–L. Ball, Hysteresis in Unemployment: Old and New Evidence (Working Paper 14818, Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge 2009); Idem, Disinflation and the NAIRU, in: 
C. Romer/D. Romer (Eds.), Reducing Inflation: Motivation and Strategy, Chicago 1997; L. Ball, 
Aggregate Demand and Long-Run Unemployment, in: Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 
1999, pp. 189-251; Idem/G. Mankiw, The NAIRU in Theory and Practice, in: The Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives 16, 2002, pp. 115-136. 
17–S. Nickell, Unemployment: Questions and Some Answers, in: The Economic Journal 108, 
1998, pp. 802-816, here pp. 815-816. 
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had been.18 Among economists the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of 
Unemployment) came to be preferred to the NRU, in designating the equilib-
rium rate of unemployment. Even then, the direction of causation was unclear. 
Did the unemployment rate cause the NAIRU, rather than vice versa?  




















1965 -2 322 35 47 23 36 461 
1970 -48 314 -18 111 -6 29 382 
1971 29 -162 38 154 8 47 114 
1972 -10 -169 1 114 18 71 25 
1973 -10 718 -22 312 264 267 1,529 
1974 -39 1,086 -6 323 -152 -167 1,045 
1975 193 -1,063 98 -247 -91 -244 -1,354 
1976 -24 396 73 182 271 3 901 
1977 26 807 -88 544 51 484 1,824 
1978 112 255 10 560 456 411 1,804 
1979 -87 359 -73 1,061 481 421 2,162 
1980 302 -2,546 135 -392 -429 358 -2,572 
1981 -26 -2,115 130 -260 190 -687 -2,768 
1982 108 -1,855 441 -68 1 185 -1,188 
1983 -101 -3 432 169 -35 1,003 1,465 
1984 -41 836 -445 12 465 470 1,296 
1985 -314 -493 373 -85 267 1,073 821 
1986 -115 -555 -28 237 720 423 682 
1987 -34 -335 -93 587 755 348 1,228 
1988 24 873 37 971 791 1,637 4,333 
1989 214 164 113 775 346 1,065 2,677 
1990 -103 -1,913 -129 -552 181 716 -1,800 
1991 172 -3,769 177 -648 -401 -458 -4,927 
1992 74 -1,544 -136 96 230 -657 -1,937 
1993 -71 -1,544 -253 843 411 912 329 
1994 -210 1,231 -533 511 953 1,352 3,303 
Source: Central Statistical Office, Economic Trends. Annual Supplement, 1996, London 1995, 
Table 4.7. 
|| 
18–M. Friedman, Inflation and Unemployment. Nobel Memorial Lecture, 13 December 1976, in: 
The Journal of Political Economy 85, 1977, pp. 451-472. 
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As the stock of long-term, involuntary unemployed grew, so the supply of 
available labour was lower than it would otherwise have been. Inasmuch as this 
represented an inward shift of the labour supply curve, wage rates rose and 
exceeded the rate of inflation. While recent increases in unemployment would 
add to the number of short-term unemployed and would have a moderating 
influence on wage claims, as in time the previously short-term joined the ranks 
of the long-term, so wage claims would rise again. As such, the equilibrium rate 
of unemployment rose.19 Employers themselves appeared to be biased against 
employing the long-term unemployed and used unemployment duration as a 
screening device. In contrast to the rational expectations approach of drawing 
the future back into the present, this view of the labour market emphasised the 
influence of the past on the present. Phelps noted this, arguing that inasmuch 
as the existing stock of unemployed weighed on current wage negotiations then 
there may have been a hysteresis effect in unemployment.20 Hysteresis, a term 
hailing from the world of electro-magnetic fields and referring to a remaining 
effect after the original disturbance has been removed, recognises the depend-
ence of a system on both past and current inputs. Accepting the influence of the 
past on the present also emphasised the sequential, rather than the static nature 
of economic decision-making and admitted different times into the moment of 
decision-making.21 Or in the words of John Hicks:  
“It is not enough to think in terms of time-series. The time-units must be linked together 
and they must be linked in time, future becoming present, and present becoming past, as 
time goes on. One must assume that the people in one’s models do not know what is going 
to happen, and know that they do not know what is going to happen. As in history!”22 
For the unemployed, over time their work experience faded, their job-specific 
skills decayed and in some cases their former places of work no longer existed. 
Long-term unemployment was such that by April 1986 of all the male unem-
ployed over the age of 25, over one half had been on the unemployment register 
|| 
19–S. Burgess/H. Turon, Unemployment Dynamics in Britain, in: The Economic Journal 115, 
2005, pp. 423-448, here p. 445. 
20–R. Cross/E. Phelps, Hysteresis and the Natural Rate of Unemployment, in: Quarterly Journal 
of Business and Economics 25, 1986, pp. 56-64; E. Phelps, Inflation Policy and Unemployment 
Theory, London 1972; Idem, Phillips Curves, pp. 254-281. 
21–S. Nickell, Unemployment: A Survey, in: The Economic Journal 100, 1990, pp. 391-439; R. 
Cross, Hysteresis and Instability in the Natural Nate of Unemployment, in: J. Cunningham 
Wood/R. Woods (Eds.), The Critical Assessments of Milton Friedman, London 1990, pp. 1-20; 
Cross, Rate of Unemployment. 
22–J. Hicks, Economic Perspectives: Further Essays on Money and Growth, Oxford 1977, p. vii. 
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for more than a year. Over a third had been unemployed for at least two years, 
and more than a quarter had been unemployed for over three years. The UK had 
more long-term unemployed (defined as more than a year out of work) than any 
other EEC country, and accounted for almost 30 percent of all EEC long-term 
unemployed. Among the unemployed, particular groups stood out. One was the 
young, especially the under 20s who were more than twice as likely to enter 
unemployment than any of the over 25 age groups and had a 25 percent chance 
of entering unemployment in any one year.23 This reflected in part their high 
degree of job mobility which resulted in turn from their low levels of specific 
human capital and the relatively low current costs of unemployment. Their age-
related duration data also suggested that it was easier for them to find work 
again. The probability of entering unemployment fell sharply with age, reaching 
its lowest level in the 40-54 age group before rising again in old age. Expected 
durations, on the other hand, rose steadily with age, reflecting the increasing 
difficulty of finding suitable alternative employment as individuals aged. The 
unmarried had a much higher incidence of unemployment than their married 
counterparts, and among the married, those with a large number (four or more) 
of children had very high unemployment rates.24 This may have been because 
the considerable discrepancy in the level of state-provided family support be-
tween those in work and those out of work caused men with large families to 
prolong their unemployment spells in the search for relatively highly paid 
work.25 Comparing a year group of married and unmarried men, unmarried men 
aged 39 had more than a 50 percent higher incidence of unemployment than 
their married counterparts, the majority of which may be accounted for by the 
higher duration of the unmarried. Their probability of entry was only 20 percent 
greater. This seems to indicate either that unmarried individuals were more 
likely to extend their unemployment spells, perhaps because there was less 
pressure on them to take up another job, or that prospective employers pre-
ferred married men because they regarded them as more reliable. There was 
some casual evidence in favour of this latter proposition and unmarried men of 
that age were known to be more likely to suffer from such illnesses as mental 
instability and alcoholism than their married counterparts. 
|| 
23–S. Nickell, A Picture of Male Unemployment in Britain, in: The Economic Journal 90, 1980, 
pp. 776-794, here p. 779. 
24–Nickell, Male Unemployment, p. 784. 
25–W. Daniel/E. Stilgoe, Where Are They Now? A Follow-Up Study of the Unemployed (PEP 
Report 572, London 1977). 
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4  Industrial Conflict 
As unemployment rose, so too did the incidence of industrial action (see table 2). 
Not only was there a higher number of days lost because of stoppages, but the 
dramatic conflicts stand out in the data. What also stood out was the variety of 
the strikes. Beginning with the miners’ strikes of 1971/72 and 1974, these started 
as a straightforward effort to raise wages and to improve working conditions. 
Miners’ wages had fallen relatively for much of the 1960s as increasing use of oil 
and the mechanisation of coal-cutting and conveying reduced the industry’s 
demand for labour. The number of wage-earners employed at collieries had 
fallen from over 700,000 in 1950-57 to below 300,000 by 1970 while over the 
same period miners’ weekly earnings fell from first place to sixth in the ranking 
of manual workers’ wages. Then as world oil prices rose in the 1970s, so too did 
the new leader of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Joe Gormley, take 
the chance to push for higher wages even if at the cost of jobs.26 Overtime bans 
were followed by national strikes in 1972 and 1974, the first since 1926, with a 
three-day week being instituted by the government from the start of 1974. Call-
ing a general election for the 28th February 1974, the Heath government lost and 
the incoming Labour government settled with the miners. 
In 1979 it was the turn of the Labour government’s re-election campaign to 
be damaged by the recent memory of a national industrial dispute. This was the 
1978-1979 ‘winter of discontent’ which Prime Minister James Callaghan, a son of 
Portsmouth, was unable to make ‘glorious summer’, limping off instead after 
defeat in the 3rd May 1979 general election to join Anthony Eden as the second 
post-war Prime Minister never to have won a general election. The public sector 
strikes of 1978/79 marked the end of attempts to enforce an incomes policy. 
Beginning as a social compact in 1974 designed to obtain zero real wage growth 
through consensus, it mutated into a social contract and a phased incomes and 
prices policy from July 1975. Phase 1 imposed flat-rate increases, of £6 a week, 
and an annual upper income limit, of £8,500, beyond which no wage increases 
were allowed. Phase 2 of the policy, in July 1976, reduced the nominal increase 
maximum to £4 a week. By 1978, as real wages fell, not least as the exchange 
rate rose, so the incomes policy began to unravel. The Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) was unable to get its member unions to continue adhering to the policy 
and a return to free collective bargaining ensued. The phase 2 government-rec- 
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ommended nominal pay increase norm of five per cent was not rescinded, but in 
the main it was not adhered to.27 
Governments’ industrial disputes with the miners in the first decade of the 
1970s and with public sector workers towards the end of the decade essentially 
concerned wages and had considerable effects on the general public whether in 
electricity blackouts, the three-day week or the unburied bodies and uncol-
lected rubbish of the discontented winter. Some of the most notable instances of 
industrial action occurred in more newly-nationalised companies like the Brit-
ish Steel Corporation (BSC), British Leyland (BL) and Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
(UCS). These may have begun concerning wages but in time came increasingly 
to concern jobs. These strikes were highly televisual, whether it was workers 
gathered in the BL car park at Longbridge or Jimmy Reid leading the UCS work-
in. The effects on the public were not equivalent to the miners’ and public sector 
strikes, but the fears of unemployment sometimes in areas of already high un-
employment were genuine. Similarly, the miners’ strike of 1984/85 called by the 
new leader of the NUM, Arthur Scargill in the spring of 1984, concerned jobs,28 
was highly televisual and did raise questions as to the economic cost and bene-
fits of the rate of run-down of the coal mining industry.29 
A conspicuous feature of broad industrial policy in the 1980s concerned the 
enactment on new legislation affecting trade unions. Evaluating the economic 
effect of such legislation is difficult.30 Higher unemployment, deindustrialisa-
tion and shifts in the industrial structure were probably more important in ef-
fecting change in industrial relations than legislation. The legislation sought to 
define and confine the rights of individuals while also threatening union assets. 
Statistically, days lost through sickness were always more important than those 
lost in industrial disputes and it is arguable that for all the drama of the strikes 
in steel and coal in the 1980s they were of little economic significance. The NUM 
strike of 1984/85 was extremely important for those involved and the regions in 
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which they lived. Yet with coal imports available from Poland and Australia, the 
economic significance of the strike was much less than its political importance. 
The main disputes, whether at Orgreave Colliery, South Yorkshire or in Notting-
hamshire, concerned issues of freedom of movement, and not coal production. 
The employment and union legislation of the Thatcher governments is inter-
esting as an example of the use of the law to draw the boundaries of the market. 
While ostensibly protecting individuals directly involved in strikes, it reduced 
their ability to use their collective market power to further their dispute. High 
unemployment and deindustrialisation fell on areas of the economy which had 
traditionally received regional aid.31 In the 1980s regional aid fell. In one sense 
this may have reflected an elevated view of the ability of markets to reallocate 
resources, in this case of surplus labour. It seemed to reflect a changed political 
attitude towards a level of unemployment higher than that which had existed 
during the Golden Age.  
5  Social Norms, Institutions and Factor Mobility 
The context in which labour was shed in the 1970s and 1980s was different from 
that in the Golden Age, as too were the prominent, often non-British, industri-
alists. New social norms were reflected in the more direct, less consensual style 
of South-African Michael Edwardes who from 1977 took on the task of rational-
ising plants and models to bring BL “Back From The Brink”; John Harvey Jones 
who slimmed down and broke up ICI after it reported the first loss in its history 
in the third quarter of 1980;32 Eddie Shah and Rupert Murdoch (Australian) in 
newspapers; Graham Day (Canadian) at British Shipbuilders; and Ian Mac-
Gregor (American) at British Steel and then at the National Coal Board where he 
referred to his own workforce as “The Enemy Within”. The change in social 
norms was also reflected in the altered attitude of government towards high 
unemployment. As Tony Atkinson noted, the Treasury had abandoned what 
Samuel Brittan in The Treasury under the Tories 1951-1964, characterised as its 
behaving like “a simple Pavlovian dog responding to two main stimuli: one is ’a 
run on the reserves‘ and the other is ’500,000 unemployed.‘ On the whole (alt-
hough not invariably), it had been officials who had panicked on the first stim-
ulus, and ministers on the second”, the belief of politicians being that an in-
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crease in the unemployment rate from five to ten percent would be at a cost of 
political popularity.33  
That productivity did improve in manufacturing industries was to a consid-
erable extent due to shedding labour. As output stagnated between 1973 and 
1979 and employment fell, so labour productivity rose at 0.9 percent p.a., and 
rose faster at 4.8 percent p.a. between 1979 and 1999 as employment continued 
to fall.34 TFP grew more slowly than labour productivity from the 1970s as the 
capital stock continued to expand rapidly.35 In a sense, this was not solving 
problems, but stepping away from them and dumping them in the laps of the 
unemployed. That the run-down of manufacturing (deindustrialisation) was 
proportionately greater (and faster) in the UK than in other developed econo-
mies was potentially damaging to economic growth since the productivity of 
manufacturing compared with that of Germany and the United States was supe-
rior to that of the service sector.36 In manufacturing, for the long period since 
1870 there was a long-run stationarity of comparative labour productivity levels 
in manufacturing for both the USA/UK and Germany/UK comparisons, although 
after World War II faster labour productivity growth in West Germany and the 
sharp deterioration of British manufacturing productivity performance during 
the 1970s led to the opening of a substantial productivity gap with Germany by 
1979. Improved productivity growth in Britain during the 1980s closed much of 
that gap, although the United States retained a substantial labour productivity 
lead over both Germany and Britain especially following the strong productivity 
performance of US manufacturing during the 1990s which returned the USA/UK 
comparative labour productivity ratio in manufacturing to its long-run two-to-
one level.37 
Manufacturing industry was both reduced in its proportionate economic 
importance and in the importance attached to it in the industrial policies which 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s. The development of globalisation, the es-
sence of which was the ability of companies to split stages of production be-
tween countries, reduced the influence of national governments over individual 
companies. While in the first instance routine production was moved to low-
income countries, there was and remained the possibility that the higher-skill 
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managerial, design and research work might also be moved there too, or at least 
from one developed economy to another.38 There were also concerns that while 
by 1998 more than half of the UK’s exports of services in 1998 were knowledge-
based, in key knowledge-based activities such as research and development 
(R&D) the UK still spent something like 45 per cent less than the USA and Japan. 
R&D, like skills growth, was viewed as an area of broad capital accumulation 
and it was in creating an environment favourable to growth that industrial pol-
icy focussed.39 The benefits of endogenous rather than exogenous growth were 
emphasised and evidence cited that investment in R&D and skills had positive 
externalities which might be lacking in physical investment.40 The shift towards 
greater emphasis on human capital necessarily reduced the emphasis on physi-
cal capital investment and technological progress, as was evident in the move-
ment in interest from exogenous to endogenous growth models.41 
Industrial policy now emphasised more a supply-side perspective with the 
rhetoric speaking of the encouragement of long-term research and investment, 
the promotion of competitive markets, and the equipping of the labour force 
with the requisite skills and aspirations. Certainly the ‘New Labour’ govern-
ment’s industrial policy was focussed on competition policy, technology policy, 
and education and training policy. In 1993, the Office of Science and Technol-
ogy published the White Paper entitled, Realising Our Potential: A Strategy for 
Science, Engineering and Technology which emphasised the importance of ap-
plied research and the commercialization of the science base.42 In 1998 was 
published the White Paper, Our Competitive Future: Building the Knowledge 
Driven Economy which reemphasised the importance to improving productivity 
of improving skills, investment, R&D, and innovation.43 Such ambitions were 
not so different from those of Balogh and Kaldor but the means of their desired 
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achievement were. The criticism of Kaldor’s prioritisation of manufacturing and 
the absence of strong econometric evidence in support of Verdoorn’s Law, 
which posited a positive relationship between the level of output and produc-
tivity-enhancing economies of scale and technological improvement, gathered 
pace in the 1970s and maintained its momentum in the 1980s when ‘catch-up’ 
explanations of an observed convergence of growth rates became popular.44 In 
turn, catch-up theory with its emphasis on technological transfer and techno-
logical progress as a source of growth was criticised by advocates of endoge-
nous growth theory.45  
While it would be unfair of Kaldor to say that he favoured a policy of ‘pick-
ing winners’, both he and Balogh in the heyday of industrial policy of the 1964-
1970 Wilson governments did prioritise the needs of manufacturing industry. 
That is no longer à la mode. Indeed rather than ‘picking winners’, the fashiona-
ble talk is now of ‘choosing races and placing bets’.46 This less specific approach 
to industrial policy is concerned more with social capital, although there is still 
concern with economies of scale such as the agglomeration benefits which ac-
crue as, in the new economic geography, cities increase and obtain productivity 
gains through knowledge spillovers, better availability of intermediate inputs 
and the advantage of a deeper labour pool. As this happens, so the transport 
and communications infrastructure becomes of increasing importance.47 Such 
an approach to industrial policy emphasises the ‘SimCity’ coordinating systems-
based approach which seeks to provide an environment conducive to growth 
and innovation.48 Important aspects of this new industrial policy remain con-
cerned with allowing time for ideas to be brought to fruition and attempting to 
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reduce the uncertainty surrounding likely rates of return on new investment. In 
part, the need to provide such assurance and reduce uncertainty is probably 
greater now than it was in the Golden Age when until the late 1970s, a range of 
institutions and institutional agreements seemed to provide some assurance 
that the future would not look so different from the present.49  
Such institutional arrangements spanned nationalised monopoly indus-
tries, a Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, government subsidies to 
industry, public housing, hospital and school-building programmes, defence 
procurement and the apparently beneficial domestic monopsonist role of the 
National Health Service and the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 
(PPRS) in providing adequate incentives for the development of the UK pharma-
ceutical industry.50 This was in part through the prices, demand and rate of 
returns on offer but also in providing a strong research base through the Medi-
cal Research Council and the leading research universities. With the periodic 
public finance pressures from the mid-1970s, the state reduction in direct fixed 
capital investment, a reduction in industrial subsidies from £ 8.9 billion (1980 
prices) in 1970 to £ 0.4bn in 1987/8851 and the opening up of the domestic mar-
ket to greater international competition, these sources of reduced uncertainty 
diminished. As ever a balanced judgement requires the trade-offs to be recog-
nised. Greater international competition did cause redundancies in the UK-
owned motor vehicle industry and in steel, which were important contributors 
to the rising unemployment of the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, it is 
difficult to argue that the steel industry in particular but also the UK-owned 
motor vehicle industry were performing well. In general, the effective combin-
ing of capital and large grouping of labour at sites appears to have been a chal-
lenge which managers either ducked, or, more likely, had insufficient incen-
tives to take on. 
The changes in the assumptions and mechanisms of industrial policy were 
also reflected in the privatisation programmes of the Thatcher governments 
(1979-1990) and the liberalisation of the financial services industry. Privatisa-
tion, whether of publicly-owned industries or of publicly-owned (council) hous-
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ing was essentially a transfer of assets from public to private ownership. Public 
ownership of nationalised industries was associated with monopolistic market 
structures and with insufficient incentives for improving productivity. In hous-
ing, private ownership of itself was assumed to improve the incentives to care 
for property. The prospect of tax-free capital gains on the principal residence, 
sold at a discount to council tenants, will also have helped. In former national-
ised industries, the change of ownership was also intended to be accompanied 
by the introduction of competition. The natural monopoly component (usually 
the network) in utility industries such as telecommunications, gas and electrici-
ty was to be separated from the rest of the industry and competition encouraged 
to supply into and sell out from the grid.  
Over the period 1979 to 1992 the UK government raised more than £ 40 bil-
lon by share sales, and that is before counting the sale of council houses, argu-
ably the largest single privatisation of them all. Yet it proved easier and more 
popular to transfer assets than to introduce competition. Opposition from work-
ers and managers in nationalised industries to the loss of their monopoly posi-
tion was effective, and no nationalised industries were privatised into an effec-
tive competitive structure in the first instance. The task of introducing 
competition into the industries fell to the regulators. To give just one example, 
British Gas was privatised as a vertically integrated monopoly in 1986 with a 
monopoly franchise to supply customers taking less than 25,000 therms a year 
(the franchise limit was reduced to 2,500 therms a year in 1992) at regulated 
prices. British Gas had complete control of the distribution and transmission 
system needed to supply other customers. Although British Gas was required to 
allow other suppliers to use its network, and thereby encourage ‘gas to gas’ 
competition, these aspirant competitors had to negotiate with British Gas the 
terms on which gas could be transported across its network.52 In addition, there 
were strong suspicions that British Gas would compete aggressively on price in 
areas where it feared competitors might enter. Such entry deterrent behaviour, 
deterring someone from not doing something, is effective and difficult to moni-
tor. Most new entrants concentrated on selling gas to the new power station 
market, where they achieved a market share of around 75 percent by March 
1991, but they were conspicuous by their comparative absence in other gas mar-
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kets. British Gas spent much of its first decade of existence preparing for or 
being investigated by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission.53  
In contrast to the difficulties in introducing competition into former nation-
alised industry markets, the financial services market proved more amenable to, 
and keener on, liberalisation. The Thatcher governments removed capital con-
trols, encouraged bank lending to be influenced more by the price (interest rate) 
of borrowing rather than income-based administrative restrictions applied by 
banks and building societies. Building societies were also enabled to move 
away from mutualised status and to become banks. With the government wish-
ing to maintain influence over monetary policy and committed to unrestricted 
capital markets, options such as joining the Euro were effectively closed off and 
that was even before consideration was given to the mismatch between this 
common currency and optimum currency area theory. However, the very mobil-
ity of financial capital, and the fundamental temporal nature of the maturity 
transformation function of banking (in which short-term, liquid deposits are 
converted into long-term illiquid assets) always carried the risk of banking and 
liquidity crises occurring in a more market-based global financial system. In 
contrast to the absence of banking crises during the Bretton Woods period, 
there were three major banking crises in OECD countries in the 1970s, five in the 
1980s and six in the 1990s in France (1994), Italy (1990), Sweden and Finland 
(1991), Japan (1992) and South Korea (1998).54  
Financial deregulation provided opportunities for the growth of large global 
banks and securitised products such as mortgage-backed securities.55 Invest-
ment banks merged to obtain the capital base they needed to increase their 
transactions in traded products, and de-mutualised building societies, now 
acting like banks, borrowed increasingly from wholesale financial markets. 
Believing houses to provide a secure form of collateral, the risk weightings of 
products like mortgage-backed securities were rated as low, although these 
securities had been sold on many times over and the mortgages were funda-
mentally financed by high levels of leveraged borrowing. Whatever the retro-
spective wisdom, like New York, London became a centre for global banks earn-
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ing an increasing share of their profits from trading rather than the duller activi-
ty of traditional banking. The growth of global banking encouraged continuing 
change in the industrial structure of Britain. Having been just under one-third of 
GDP in 1970, manufacturing accounted for just over one-tenth by 2012. While 
manufacturing’s share of GDP fell from 24.6 percent in 1985 to 21.8 percent in 
1995, that of financial intermediation and real estate rose from 20.1 percent in 
1985 to 26.2 percent in 1995.56  
Regionally, the South East of England including London accounted for just 
over one-third of UK GDP between 1971 and 1995. London and the south-east 
continued to diverge from the rest of the UK, with only Scotland and Northern 
Ireland showing signs of convergence. Wales and all other areas of England fell 
further behind. Yet, from 1979 government investment subsidies fell signifi-
cantly, partly reflecting the outlook of the Thatcher and successive governments 
and also in response to European Union concerns that firms compete on an 
equal footing without subsidies.57 In traditional manufacturing areas where 
agglomerations of financial, intellectual and economic expertise were not de-
veloping to replace former sources of employment, there began to form layers of 
labour who were not sharing in the benefits of economic growth. 
6  Conclusion 
This paper has concentrated on the broad assumptions and aspirations under-
pinning economic and industrial policy since the late 1970s. This is principally 
because the industrial policy identified with the Golden Age rested on the as-
sumption that there was a role for government in compensating for a market 
failure to produce desired and timely industrial restructuring and modernisa-
tion. In promoting investment and productivity, priority was given to the needs 
of manufacturing industry and the main aim of macroeconomic policy was the 
pursuit of low unemployment. When the problem of inflation emerged, one 
approach favoured was to seek consensual pay agreements with the trade un-
ions. From the mid-1970s, these approaches and assumptions began to fade, 
and gave way to a macroeconomic policy more concerned with reducing infla-
tion than unemployment and which favoured often highly theoretical market-
based approaches to problems of unemployment and deindustrialisation. In 
unemployment policy, talk of the natural rate of unemployment was increas-
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ingly heard. In industrial policy, little was done to slow the rate of deindustriali-
sation and the MTFS seemed almost purposely designed to accelerate it. Indus-
trial policy became more concerned to increase the incentives for labour mobili-
ty and job-seeking, than to offer protection to industries while restructuring and 
modernisation were attempted. Joining the Common Market and presiding over 
a rapid appreciation in the exchange rate simply increased the competitive 
pressures on export industries. So too did the privatisation of nationalised in-
dustries like electricity, since it freed them from an obligation to take supplies of 
domestic coal. That manufacturing industry shrank as quickly as it did was 
unfortunate as it was, common to popular belief, one of the stronger parts of the 
UK’s comparative productivity performance, and the labour shed did not imme-
diately find employment again elsewhere. Indeed, the longer it remained un-
employed, the less employable it appeared to become. In this context, the spe-
cific details of industrial policy fade in importance compared with the 
fundamentally altered role which was assigned to market mechanisms in the 
restructuring of British industry. 
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